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Communities managing common pool resources, such as forests, constitute a significant 
example of group functioning. In recent years community forestry groups have mushroomed 
in South Asia. But how participative, equitable and efficient are they? In the short term, many 
have done well in regenerating degraded lands. Are they, however, performing at their best 
potential, and will they sustain? Equally, are the benefits and costs being shared equitably 
between rich and poor households and between women and men? 
 
The paper demonstrates that seemingly successful groups can cloak significant gender 
exclusions, inequities and inefficiencies. It argues that these outcomes can be traced 
especially to rules, norms, perceptions, and the personal and household endowments and 
attributes of those participating. Reducing the gender bias embedded in these factors would 
depend on women's bargaining power with the State, the community and the family. The 
paper outlines the likely determinants of women's bargaining power in these arenas, and 
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THE HIDDEN SIDE OF GROUP BEHAVIOUR:  





Rural community forestry groups, managing State or community-owned forest resources, represent 
one of the most rapidly growing forms of collective action in the developing world. They thus 
provide an especially useful study in how groups function. This paper focuses on South Asian 
experience to illuminate how such groups, ostensibly set up to operate on principles of cooperation, 
and meant to involve and benefit all sections of the community, often effectively exclude significant 
sections, such as women. While seemingly participative, equitable and efficient, they cloak 
substantial gender-related inequities and inefficiencies. The chapter also analyses what underlies such 
unfavourable outcomes and how the outcomes could be improved.  
 
The interactive effect of one outcome on another is examined as well. For instance, excluding 
women (often the principal users of community forests) from a group's decision-making bodies 
could have a range of negative efficiency fallouts, such as the framing of inappropriate or inequitable 
rules which are difficult to enforce. I analyze these issues here mainly from a gender perspective, 
since they typically cut across class/caste divisions. Where relevant, the interplay of class/caste with 
gender, in defining outcomes for different categories of women, is also outlined.  
 
The paper argues that the outcomes of group functioning are determined especially by rules, norms, 
and perceptions, in addition to the household and personal endowments and attributes of those 
affected. All these factors can work to the disadvantage of women, both separately and 
interactively. To what extent they can be changed in women's favour will depend on their bargaining 
power  vis-a-vis the State, the community, and the family. The factors that are likely to affect 
women's bargaining power in these three arenas are also spelt out. While the context here is 
community forestry, the overall conceptual framework would be relevant to understanding gendered 
dimensions of group functioning in a number of other contexts as well.  
 
The paper is based largely on exploratory fieldvisits that I made during 1998-99 to 87 community 
forestry sites across five states of India (Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and the 
Uttar Pradesh hills) and two districts (Kaski and Dang) of Nepal.
2 This is supplemented by existing 
case studies and some earlier visits to selected sites in a few states. Information was obtained mostly 
through unstructured interviews with villagers, at times conducted with women and men in separate 
groups, at other times jointly, in addition to individual interviews with key informants, especially 
office bearers in the executive committees of the community forestry groups.  
                                                 
    
1 This is a shorter and updated version of a paper (Agarwal, 2000A) presented at the Conference on ‘Group 
Behaviour and Development’, held at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki, September 1999. I am most grateful to Judith Heyer 
for her comments on the present version.  
    
2 In India, the term `state' relates to the biggest administrative divisions within the country and is not to be 
confused with `State', used throughout in the political economy sense of the word. In Nepal the biggest 








  II. BACKGROUND 
 
For rural households in South Asia, forests and village commons have always been important 
sources of basic necessities and supplementary livelihoods, providing firewood, fodder, small timber, 
and various non-timber products. Especially for the poor and women who own little private land, 
they have been a critical part of survival. In India's semi-arid regions in the 1980s, the landless and 
landpoor procured over 90% of their firewood and satisfied 69-89% of their grazing needs from 
common pool resources (Jodha, 1986). In that period, firewood alone provided 65-67% of total 
domestic energy in the hills and desert areas of India and over 90% in Nepal as a whole (Agarwal, 
1987). Today, firewood remains the single most important source (and for many the only source) of 
rural domestic energy in most of South Asia, and is still largely gathered, not bought.
3   
 
Over the decades, however, people's ability to fulfil such needs has been eroding with the decline in 
communal resources, due both to degradation and to shifts in property rights away from community 
hands to State and individual hands. The formation of community forest management groups in 
recent years represents a small but notable reversal in these processes of statization and 
privatization, toward a reestablishment of greater community control over forests and village 
commons. Indeed there is now a mushrooming of community forestry groups (CFGs) in South 
Asia.
4 Some of these groups are State-initiated, others self-initiated by communities, and yet others 
catalyzed interactively by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), villagers, and local state officials.  
 
In India, these CFGs include: (a) the groups formed under the State-initiated Joint Forest 
Management (JFM) programme launched in 1990, in which village communities and the government 
share the responsibilities and benefits of regenerating degraded local forests; (b) self-initiated groups, 
started autonomously by a village council, youth club or village elder and concentrated mainly in 
Bihar and Orissa; and (c) groups with a mixed history, such as the van panchayats or forest 
councils in the hills of Uttar Pradesh (UP) initiated by the British in the 1930s. Some of them have 
survived or been revived by NGOs. JFM groups are the most widespread, both geographically and 
in forest area, and over time the programme is expected to include all Indian states. To date, virtually 
all Indian states have passed JFM resolutions. These allow participating villagers access to most 
non-timber forest products and to 25-50% (varying by state) of any mature timber harvested. There 
are some 36,000 JFM groups today, covering 10.2 million hectares (mha) or 13.3% of the 76.5 
mha administered as forest land (Bahuguna 2000). In addition, there would be a few thousand 
groups of the other types.  
 
Nepal’s community forestry programme launched in 1993,is largely State-initiated. Here the State 
transfers even good forest land to a set of identified users who form a forest user group (FUG) and 
who are entitled to all of the benefits.
5 In 1996, there were 5356 FUGs in 1996 covering 0.36 m ha 
or 6.7% of Nepal's 5.8 m ha of total forest land (Joshi, 1996). By 2000, the number had increased 
to 9100 FUGs involving one million households and covering 11.4% of forest land (Government of 
                                                 
    
3 For India, see Natrajan (1995).  
    
4 I will be using CFG as a general term to cover all types of community forestry groups. 
    






Nepal, 2000), the target being 61%. In both India and Nepal, NGOs can act as catalysts or 
intermediaries in group formation and functioning.  
 
However, unlike the old systems of communal resource management, which typically recognized the 
usufruct rights of all village residents, the new CFGs represent a more formalized system of rights. 
Typically these rights are based either on membership (as in the state-initiated groups), or on rules 
specified by selected (often self selected) community members (as in the self-initiated groups). In 
other words, membership, or some other formal system, is replacing village citizenship as the 
defining criterion for establishing rights in the commons.  
 
This raises some critical questions, such as: how are the CFGs performing in terms of participation, 
equity and efficiency from the perspective of women, especially the poor? Are the benefits and costs 
being shared equitably, or are they creating a system of property rights in communal land which, like 
existing rights in privatized land, are strongly elite and/or male centered?  The section below focuses 
on these concerns. 
 
 
  III. OUTCOMES: PARTICIPATION, EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY 
 
In terms of forest regeneration, many CFGs have had notable success. Often all that is involved is 
restriction of entry, and protection, although, in some cases, replanting is also undertaken. Even with 
simple protection, natural revival is often rapid if the rootstock is intact. Within five to seven years of 
protection, many of the severely degraded tracts in semi-arid India have been covered with young 
trees; and areas with some vegetation, but notably declining, show encouraging signs of 
regeneration. In fact in most ecological zones, as a result of the CFG initiatives, beneficial results are 
noted, and in a number of cases incomes and employment are reported to have increased,
6 seasonal 
outmigration fallen,
7 the land’s carrying capacity improved, and biodiversity enhanced.
8 Some 
villages have even received awards for conservation (Shah and Shah, 1995; my fieldvisits during 
1998-99).  
 
Viewed from a gender perspective (and especially the perspective of poor women) however, these 
results look less impressive on several important counts: effective participation; equity in the sharing 
of costs and benefits; and efficiency in functioning. 
 
  3.1 Participation 
 
In both India and Nepal, the state-initiated groups broadly have a two-tier organisational structure, 
consisting of a general body with members drawn from the whole village and an executive committee 
(henceforth called EC) of some 9-15 persons. Typically the general body meets once or twice a 
year and the EC meets about once a month. Both bodies, interactively, define the rules for forest use 
and benefit sharing, the structure of fines for rule violation, the method of protection (e.g, guards, 
patrol groups, etc.), and so on. Which set of persons have a voice in the general body and the EC 
                                                 
    
6 See, e.g., Raju et al. (1993), Kant et al (1991), and SPWD (1994). 
    
7 See, Viegas and Menon (1993) and Chopra and Gulati (1997). 
    






has a critical bearing on how well these organisations function, and who gains or loses from them. 
 
Women's effective participation in CFG decision-making would require not only that they become 
members of the group (the general body, the EC, etc); but that they attend and speak up at group 
meetings, and (at least some of the time) are able to ensure that decisions are in their interest. Such 
participation can be seen as important both in itself, as an indicator of democratic institutional 
functioning, and for its effect on cost and benefit sharing and efficiency. To what extent do women in 
general, and poor women in particular, so participate?  
 
(a) Participation in management 
 
Women usually constitute less than 10% of the general bodies in most JFM groups;
9 they are usually 
absent in the self-initiated groups;
10 and are few or none in the van panchayats.
11 A study of 50 
van panchayats found that only 9 had any women members (Tata Energy Research Institute, 
1995). Their presence in Nepal’s FUGs is similarly sparse. A study of seven FUGs in eastern Nepal 
found that only 3.5% of those recorded as users in the FUGs were women (Dahal, 1994: 78).  
 
In India, the eligibility criteria for membership in the JFM general body and EC vary by state. Eight 
out of the 22 states for which there is informatioin allow general body membership to only one 
person per household. This is inevitably the male household head. In 8 other states, as a result of 
amendments in the initial orders, both spouses, or one man and one woman, can now be members, 
but this still excludes other household adults. Only three states allow membership to all village adults. 
In the self-initiated autonomous CFGs, the customary exclusion of women from village decision-
making bodies has been replicated. In Nepal's FUGs, again, the household is the unit of 
membership, and in male-headed households it is the man's name that is entered in the membership 
list (Seeley, 1996). 
 
Without being CFG general body members, women usually hear little about what transpires at 
meetings. Many women complain: 
 
Our husbands don’t tell us about meetings. They simply say they have a meeting and go 
when the watchman brings around the notice for the meeting (woman to author, Five village 
mouza, Orissa, 1998). 
 
  When we ask them what happened at the meeting, they say: what will you gain by knowing? 
(women to author, Five village mouza, Orrisa, 1998). 
 
  Typically men don't tell their wives what happens in meetings. Even if there is a dispute 
about something, they don't tell us; nor do they volunteer information about other matters 
(women to author, Kheripada village, Gujarat, 1999). 
   
Women's representation in the ECs is also typically low, although there is some variation by context. 
                                                 
    
9 Roy et al (1992), Guhathakurta and Bhatia (1992), and Narain (1994); also my fieldvisits 1998-99.  
    
10 Kant et al. (1991), Singh and Kumar (1993), and my fieldvisits 1998-99. 
    






In a study of 20 JFM groups in West Bengal (east India) 60% had no women EC members, and 
only 8% of the 180 EC members were women. Also landless families, while present in most general 
bodies, were barely represented in the ECs (Sarin, 1998). In many states, recent JFM resolutions 
require the inclusion of women in the EC, ranging from a minimum of 2 or 3 to one-third women, but 
I found that the women so included were rarely chosen by other women as their representatives. 
Sometimes male EC members chose the women in their absence and even without consulting them. 
Such women are seldom active or effective. In Nepal again, women have only a nominal presence in 
the ECs. Those who join are usually poorly informed of their FUG's activities (Upadhyay and 
Jeddere-Fisher, 1998); some are even unaware that they are EC members (Moffatt, 1998: 42).  
 
Whether from a lack of awareness, or the constraints discussed later, only a small percentage of the 
women who are general body or EC members usually attend the meetings. If they do attend they 
rarely speak up, and if they speak they find their opinions are given little weight. 
 
  What is the point of going to meetings. We would only sit silently (women to author, Panasa 
Diha village, Orissa, 1998). 
   
  Men don't listen, except perhaps one or two. Men feel they should be the spokespersons 
(woman to author, Garbe Kuna village, Kaski district, Nepal, 1998). 
 
  They did not listen to me, even when I spoke up (woman EC member to author, Ghusra 
village, Dang district, Nepal, 1999). 
 
  I attend van panchayat meetings, but I only sign, I don't say much. Or I say I agree 
(woman van panchayat member to author, Sallarautela village, UP hills). 
 
Having a voice in the EC is important since this is the site for discussions and decisions regarding 
many critical aspects of CFG functioning. As matters stand, women are not party to many crucial 
decisions. An analysis of JFM decision-making in 5 Gujarat villages revealed that all major decisions 
on forest protection, use, distribution of wood and grass, and future planning, were taken by men. 
The only joint decisions with women were those concerning tree nurseries (Joshi, 1998). Women 
are also often left out of the CFG teams that go on ‘exposure’ visits to other sites, or that receive 
technical training in new silviculture practices. 
 
Within this rather stark scenario, there are some contrasting, although atypical, examples of all-
women CFGs and mixed CFGs with a high female presence. All-women CFGs, for instance, are 
found especially in the UP hills and parts of Nepal where there is high male outmigration, and a 
scattering of them have emerged in other regions, catalyzed by a local NGO, a forest official, or an 
international donor.
12 There are no consolidated figures for India, but in Nepal, in 2000, all-women 
FUGs constituted less than 3.8 % of all FUGs, controlling 11.2% of all FUG forest land. They 
typically had very small plots of largely barren land needing tree planting: 50% had 10 ha or less 
(and seldom over 50 ha), while mixed FUGs commonly controlled a few hundred hectares and 
                                                 
    
12 E.g., Mukerjee and Roy (1993), Correa (1997), Adhikari et al (1991), Mansingh (1991), Regmi (1989), Singh and 






usually of the natural forest.
13 Similarly, mixed groups with a high female presence (say 30% or even 




(b) Participation in protection 
 
Despite their limited presence as formal members, many women still play an active role in protection 
efforts. 
 
In formal terms, protection of the bounded forest area is usually done either by employing a guard, 
with CFG members contributing the wage, or by forming a patrol group from among the member 
households. In terms of gender composition, the typical pattern is to have a male guard or an all-
male patrol. These two methods characterized 45% and 18% respectively of the 87 sites I visited. 
Only a small percentage of patrols were constituted by both men and women, or by women alone, 
and there was a rare female guard. Occasionally, there are shifts from all-women to all-men patrols, 
and vice versa. More commonly, women patrol informally. In some villages of Gujarat and the UP 
hills, they have formed separate informal protection groups parallel to men's because they feel men’s 
formal patrolling is ineffective. 
  
Women's informal vigilance improves protection in important ways. In most villages I visited, women 
told me that they had apprehended intruders both from other villages and from their own, and that 
when they caught women intruders they sought to persuade them not to break the rules. In fire 
fighting, likewise, women join the men. In several instances, the forest was saved only due to 
women’s alertness. 
  
On the one hand, therefore, most women are excluded from CFG membership and management; on 
the other hand, many women contribute in substantial ways to protection efforts, indicating their 
stake in forest regeneration. However, women's limited involvement in the decision-making process 
has implications for both equity and efficiency. 
 
 
  3.2 Equity 
 
How equitable are the CFGs in the sharing of costs and benefits? 
 
(a) Cost bearing 
 
The costs of forest protection are broadly of two types: those associated with protection and 
management and those associated with forgoing forest use due to closure. The former would include 
costs such as membership fees, the forest guard's pay, the opportunity cost of patrolling time, and so 
on  -- costs largely borne by men. The latter would include the opportunity cost of time spent in 
finding alternative sites for essential items such as firewood and fodder, other costs (identified 
below) associated with firewood shortages, the loss of livelihoods based on non-timber forest 
                                                 
   
13 Calculated from figures given in Government of Nepal (2000). 
    






products, and so on. These types of costs fall largely on women. 
 
Consider the effects relating to firewood collection. In many villages, women have been barred from 
collecting even dry twigs. Where the land was barren anyway this caused no extra hardship. But 
where earlier they could fulfil at least part of their needs from the protected area, they are now 




In the early years of JFM, Sarin (1995) had noted that in some protected sites in Gujarat and West 
Bengal, women's collection time for a headload of firewood had increased from 1-2 hours to 4-5 
hours, and journeys of half a kilometer had lengthened to 8-9. In some households, women were 
compelled to take their daughters along, spending over six hours a day to walk five times farther, for 
the same quantity of fuelwood (Shah and Shah, 1995). Over time this could negatively affect the 
girls' education. In Pingot village (Gujarat), women, when asked about a recent award for 
environmental conservation conferred on the village, expressed only resentment: ‘What forest? We 
used to go [there] to pick fuelwood, but ever since the men have started protecting it they don't even 
allow us to look at it!’ (Shah and Shah, 1995: 80). 
 
The picture has not changed dramatically since. Of the 87 CFGs I visited in 1998-99, firewood was 
available in 80. Of these 45 (60%) had banned firewood collection, with 21 not opening the forest 
at all and 24 opening it for a few days annually for drywood collection and/or cutback and cleaning 
operations. The remaining CFGs allowed some collection, usually only of fallen twigs and branches. 
Even after years of protection, women thus reported a persistence of firewood shortages in most of 
the villages I visited in Gujarat, the UP hills, Karnataka, parts of Madhya Pradesh bordering 
Gujarat, and in the Kaski and Dang districts of Nepal. The exceptions were some parts of Orissa, 
Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh with thicker forests, where protection had increased the firewood 
supply.  
 
Some common responses by the women are given below: 
 
  We go in the morning and only return in the evening. Since the end of the rainy season, we 
have been going every day. I go myself and so does my daughter. Earlier too there was a 
shortage but not as acute (woman EC member to author, Kangod village, Karnataka, 
1998). 
 
  It is women who need the forest, they need firewood to cook. ... Men preach to women 
about not cutting trees, but what can women do? They cannot cook food without firewood 
and they cannot collect firewood from other places (group discussion with women in 
Kabhre Palanchok, Nepal, cited in Hobley, 1996: 147). 
 
Women try to substitute other fuels where they can. A few are able to switch to biogas (essentially 
where there is an effective NGO programme), but most turn to twigs, dung cakes, agricultural 
waste, or even dry leaves. Fire from these latter fuels needs careful tending which increases cooking 
time and prevents women from simultaneously attending to other work. In a number of villages 
                                                 
    






women report economising on fuel by forgoing a winter fire for space heating (even in the subzero 
temperatures of the Nepal hills), not heating winter bath water or heating it only for husbands, and so 
on. 
 
Usually women from both middle and poor peasant households report such domestic energy 
problems, since even in the former, firewood is typically gathered and not purchased.  Most do not 
have many trees on their private land. Women of landless or landpoor households are, however, the 
worst off, since without private land they also have no crop waste or trees of their own, and few 
cattle for dung.
16 In fact, forest closure has necessitated many to sell off much of their animal stock. 
As a poor woman in Khut village (UP hills) told me: ‘We don't know in the morning if we will be 
able to cook at night’. Another added: ‘Our bahus (daughters-in-law) have to undertake a full day's 
journey to get a basket of grass and some firewood from the Reserve Forest.’ Her daughter-in-law 
pitched in: ‘But even in the Reserve Forest you can be caught by the forest guard. I paid Rs 20 as a 
fine to retrieve my axe, and all I was doing was cutting a fallen log.’ Similar concerns were 
expressed in several field sites in Nepal. For example, in Tallo Goungonda village (Kaski district) a 
group of poor women told me: ‘We go at night and take a stick to find our way in the dark. Other 
women have gas and stoves, but we are poor, so we have to steal.’ 
 
Similarly, since grazing is usually banned, households have to procure fodder in other ways and 
stallfeed animals. Since cattlecare is usually women's responsibility, if the household cannot afford to 
buy fodder women have to spend additional time in finding other sites for fodder and in stallfeeding. 
In parts of Gujarat women report an extra workload of 2-3 hours due to stallfeeding alone. Where 
some of the better-off households have replaced their goats with stallfed milch cattle, it has further 
increased women's labour. 
 
As the forests have regenerated, at best these hardships have been alleviated; they have not 
disappeared. Firewood shortages, for instance, continue to be reported even 8-10 years after 
protection in many regions, despite the quite large areas being protected. In nine of the 19 Gujarat 
sites I visited, the protected area exceeded a hundred hectares. By one estimate, some Gujarat 
villages have many times the per capita forest land needed for self-sufficiency in fuel and some other 
basic needs (Shah, 1997). Even allowing for overestimation, it appears likely that more can be 
extracted sustainably than is currently being allowed. In many places, therefore, the scarcities that 
women are experiencing appear to have less to do with aggregate availability than with women's 
limited bargaining power in the community. 
 
(b) Benefit sharing 
 
There are also gender inequities in benefit sharing. In some cases the benefits are not distributed at 
all. Among Orissa's self-initiated groups, for example, a number of all-male youth clubs have banned 
entry into the local forest and have been selling the wood (obtained from thinning and cleaning 
operations), as well as other forest produce. The quite substantial funds so obtained have in many 
cases been spent on an annual religious festival (my fieldvisit, 1998), or on a clubhouse or club 
functions (Singh and Kumar, 1993). 
                                                 
    
16 See also Jodha (1986) on differences between landed and landpoor rural households in India, in their relative 







In other types of CFGs also, the money is normally put in a collective fund to be used as the group 
deems fit. Women typically have little say in how it is used: 
 
  The money obtained from grass and firewood is kept by them in their fund. We have not 
seen one penny of it. We buy grass, which is auctioned by bundles (women to author, 
Ghusra village, Dang district, Nepal, 1998). 
 
Where the CFGs distribute the benefits, say in the form of firewood or grass, as in some of the JFM 
groups, women of non-member households usually receive none, since entitlements are typically 
linked to membership. Often these are poor households whose members have to migrate for work, 
or are out all day on wage labour and cannot easily contribute to patrolling or the guard's wages.  
 
Even in member households usually men alone receive the benefits directly, either because only they 
are members, or because entitlements are on a household basis, so that even if both spouses are 
members they get only one share. Of course women can benefit indirectly in some degree, say if the 
benefits are in kind (such as firewood); or where member households continue to enjoy the right to 
collect dry wood or leaves from the protected area.
17 But where the CFGs distribute cash benefits, 
money given to men does not guarantee equal sharing, or even any sharing, within the family. In fact, 
outside the context of forest management there is substantial evidence of men in poor households 
spending a significant percentage of their incomes on personal items (tobacco, liquor, etc.), with 
women spending almost all their incomes on basic household needs.
18 Not surprisingly, this pattern is 




Women are usually aware that unless they receive a share  directly (rather than through male 
members), they may get nothing. When asked their views on this at a meeting of three JFM villages 
in West Bengal, in which both women and men were present, all the women wanted equal and 
separate shares for husbands and wives (Sarin, 1995). Being members in their own right would be 
one way by which women could get the benefits directly, provided that the individual and not the 
household was the unit of entitlement. 
 
Inequities also arise because people differ in their needs, or in their ability to contribute or to pay. 
Broadly, three types of principles/norms can underlie the distribution of forest products: market-
determined, contribution, and need. While seemingly neutral,  these distributive principles have 
notable gender and class implications. The market principle (or willingness to pay), embodied in 
practices such as the auctioning of grass to the highest bidder, tends to be both unequal  and 
inequitable, since those that cannot afford to pay have to do without, even if they have contributed to 
protection either directly (say by joint patrolling), or indirectly by deferring forest use. Since rural 
women, even of rich households, tend to have less access to financial resources than men, market-
determined distribution through auctions tends to be both anti-poor and anti-women. Distribution 
according to contribution, say, by giving each household that contributes to protection an equal 
                                                 
    
17 Kant et al. (1991), ISO/Swedforest (1993), and Arul and Poffenberger (1990); also my fieldvisits in 1998-99. 
    
18 See, Mencher (1988) and Noponen (1991) for India. 
    






number of grass bundles, would be equal but inequitable for those more dependent on the commons 
for grass, such as the poorer households and women in general. Moreover, women's ability to 
contribute could be circumscribed, since even if they want to join patrol duty, norms of seclusion 
may prevent them from doing so. Where distribution embodies some concept of economic need, 
such as where poor women are given exclusive use rights to a special grass patch, in addition to 
grass bundles as above, the distribution is unequal but relatively more equitable, in that those most in 
need get more. 
 
In my fieldvisits I found that contribution was the most common criterion underlying distribution. In 
most villages, all those who were CFG members and had contributed toward protection had equal 
claims to the fuelwood or grass cut during the forest opening days. There were, however, occasional 
cases of auctioning in some villages, such as the auctioning of grass in the UP hills and Nepal, and 
the auctioning of other forest produce among some of the self-initiated groups in Orissa. Seldom did 
economic need guide distribution. Hence for poor women, in particular, even with an equal 
distribution of grass or firewood the outcome tended to prove inequitable. 
 
In recent collective action literature, questions of equity have been raised largely in terms of whether 
existing economic and social equality (or its lack) affects the possibility of collective action and 
efficient institutional functioning.
20 There has been a relative neglect of whether or not the outcomes 
of collective action (in terms of, say, cost and benefit sharing) are equitable, and how those 
outcomes impinge on the sustainability of collective action. As argued above, equitable outcomes 
need to be seen as important in themselves, for evaluating institutions governing the commons, quite 
apart from the links between equity and efficiency (as between participation and efficiency) that are 
elaborated below. 
 
  3.3 Efficiency 
 
Women’s lack of participation in CFG decision-making, and gender inequities in the sharing of costs 
and benefits from protection, can have a range of efficiency implications. As a result, some initiatives 
may fail to take off at all; others may be unable to sustain the gains, or there may be a notable gap 
between the gains realized and those realizable (in terms of resource productivity and diversity, 
satisfying household needs, enhancing incomes, etc.). Inefficiencies could stem from one or more of 
the following problems (see also, Agarwal, 2000B). 
 
First, there are rule violations. In almost all the villages I visited there were at least some cases of 
violation, and at times this was a frequent occurrence. Violations by men are usually for timber for 
self-use or sale (the latter in areas with commercially valuable trees). Violations by women are 
typically for firewood. Where a CFG bans collection without consulting the women or addressing 
their difficulties, many are under great pressure to break the rules, given their daily need for 
fuelwood. Sometimes, in situations of acute need, women enter into persistent altercations with the 
guard. In one Gujarat village the guard threatened to resign as a result. Only then did the EC address 
the issue and agree to open the forest for a few days annually.
21 In Agrawal’s study of a van 
                                                 
    
20 See e.g. Ostrom (1990), Bardhan (1993), and Baland and Platteau (1996, 1999). 
    
21  E.g., Shah and Shah (1995), Singh and Kumar (1993), and Agarwal (1997a); also my field interviews during 






panchayat village, women constituted 70-80% of the reported offenders between 1951 and 1991, 
many of them belonging to poor and low caste households. 
 
A second source of inefficiency lies in the lack of adequate information sharing with women. 
Information about the rules (especially membership rules), conflicts encountered, or other aspects of 
forest management, does not always reach the women (my fieldvisits, 1998-99). Similarly, male 
forest officials seldom consult the women or seek their feedback when preparing micro-plans for 
forest development. Some women hear about the plans through their husbands, others not at all 
(Guhathakurta and Bhatia, 1992). These communication problems can prove particularly acute in 
regions of high male outmigration. 
 
Third, inefficiencies can arise if the male guard or patrol fails to notice resource depletion. During my 
1995 fieldvisit to Gujarat, a women's informal patrol in Machipada village took me to their patrol 
site, and, pointing out the illegal cuttings which the men had missed, noted: ‘Men don't check 
carefully for illegal cuttings. Women keep a more careful lookout’. During my 1998-99 fieldwork, 
this difference was apparent in several other field sites. Part of the gender difference arises from the 
fact that women, as the main and most frequent collectors of forest products, are more familiar with 
the forest than men. 
 
Fourth, and relatedly, there are problems in catching transgressors. In virtually all the regions I 
visited, all-male patrols or male guards were unable to deal effectively  with women intruders 
because they risked being charged with sexual harassment or molestation. Threats to this effect were 
not uncommon when non-member women, or women from neighbouring villages, were caught. In 
some incidents, women and their families had even registered false police cases against the patrol 
members, or beaten them up. Equally, however, women on their own find it difficult to do night 
patrolling or to confront aggressive male intruders. By all accounts, the most efficient solution 
appears t o be a patrol team constituted of both sexes. Recognizing this, in some regions male 
patrollers have included some of their village women into their patrol group, but this is not a typical 
response.  
 
When women voluntarily set up informal patrols, even where there is a male guard or patrol, the 
efficiency of protection can improve notably. In their study of twelve van panchayats, Sharma and 
Sinha (1993) found that the four which could be deemed ‘robust’ all had active women's 
associations. However, in so far as women's groups are typically informal, they lack the authority to 
punish offenders who still have to be reported to the formal (typically all-male) committees. This 
separation of authority and responsibility introduces inefficiencies in functioning.  For instance, 
sometimes the male EC members fail to mete out punishments to the culprits women catch, causing 
the women to abandon their efforts. I found several such cases in Karnataka, Gujarat and the UP 
hills. Also, when women catch intruders, they are seldom party to discussions or decisions on 
appropriate sanctions.   
 
Fifth, and relatedly, efficient functioning requires effective methods of conflict resolution. This is 
made difficult with women's virtual exclusion from the formal committees, especially where the 
conflict involves women, as is not infrequently the case with firewood-related intrusions.  
 






species when preparing plans for forest regeneration. Women and men are often privy to different 
types of knowledge due to differences in the tasks they perform, and in their spatial domains. 
Women as the main fuel and fodder collectors can often better explain the attributes of trees than 
men (Pandey, 1990); and can identify a large number of trees, shrubs and grasses in the vicinity of 
fields and pastures (Chen, 1993). In general, women are better informed about the local 
environment where they gather and collect and men about species found in distant areas (Gaul, 
1994). Women’s systematic exclusion from decision-making and management of new planting 
programmes is thus likely to have negative efficiency implications, by failing to tap women's 
knowledge of diverse species for enhancing biodiversity, or their u nderstanding of silvicultural 
practices when planting species about which they are better informed.  
 
A seventh form of inefficiency can arise from ignoring possible gender differences in preferences, say 
regarding when grass should be cut or which trees should be planted. I found that in the rare cases 
when women were consulted, they often came up with alternative, more suitable, suggestions on 
when the forest should be opened for grass collection. Women are also known to usually prefer 
trees which have more domestic use value (as for fuel and fodder), while men more typically opt for 
trees that bring in cash.
22 This might be less so where fuel and fodder are ample, in which case 
women too might prefer commercial species (Chen, 1993), but where there are shortages women 
tend to prefer use-related varieties. Their greater involvement in forest planning could thus better 
fulfil household needs and increase commitment to the initiative. 
 
Basically, when examined from a gender perspective, it is clear that the CFGs are violating many of 
the conditions deemed by several scholars to be necessary for building enduring institutions for 
managing common pool resources. This includes conditions such as: ensuring that those affected by 
the rules participate in framing and modifying the rules; that the rules are simple and fair; that there 
are graduated and appropriate sanctions against offenders; that there are effective mechanisms for 
monitoring the resource and resolving conflicts; and so on.
23 
 
Despite women's low involvement, forests might regenerate, but some of the initiatives might not be 
sustained, and others might produce less than the full potential benefits. 
 
 
  IV. WHAT DETERMINES OUTCOMES? 
 
The gender-related efficiency outcomes discussed above are in large part secondary outcomes, 
stemming from women's low participation in the CFGs and from inequities in the rules of forest use, 
benefit sharing, etc. Efficiency outcomes are therefore not discussed separately below. Rather, I 
focus on what underlies women's low participation and the inequities in cost and benefit sharing.  
 
In broad terms, the degree of participation and the distribution of costs and benefits can be seen to 
depend especially on the following factors: rules, norms, perceptions, the person's individual 
endowments and attributes, and their household endowments and attributes (which define where 
they fall within the structural hierarchies of class, caste, etc). 
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  4.1 Factors affecting women's participation 
 
Rules: In formal CFGs, such as the JFM groups in India or the FUGs in Nepal, rules determine 
membership in the general body or EC. As noted earlier, where the rule allows membership to only 
one person per household, it is typically the male household head that becomes a member. The rule 
that allows one man and one woman per household is somewhat more inclusive; but for a rule to be 
truly inclusive all adults must be allowed to join. This is rare.  
 
A lack of awareness of rules, or of changes therein, can also constrain women's participation. In 
West Bengal, for instance, a study of 19 CFGs showed that even four years after the state order 
was amended to allow women's inclusion, barely 2/5ths of the members knew of the change (Raju, 
1997).  
 
Among the self-initiated groups (that lack formal membership rules), long-standing conventions, 
which traditionally excluded women from public decision-making forums, also deny women entry 
into the CFGs. 
 
Social norms: Even when membership rules are favourable and women join, they seldom attend or 
speak up at meetings because social norms place strictures on their visibility, mobility, and 
behaviour. These norms, whether internalized by women or imposed on them by threat of gossip, 
reprimand, or even violence, impinge directly on their autonomy and ability to participate effectively 
in CFGs dominated by men.
24 
 
Some communities have quite strict female seclusion norms. But more pervasive is the subtle 
gendering of physical space and social behaviour. For instance, norms often dictate a gender 
segregation of public space. Women of ‘good character' are expected to avoid village spaces where 
men congregate, such as tea stalls and the market place (Agarwal, 1994). For older women, the 
restriction is generally less, but never fully absent. As a result, many women feel uncomfortable going 
to CFG meetings, unless explicitly invited by the men: 
 
  The meetings are considered for men only. Women are never called. The men attend and 
their opinions or consent are taken as representative of the whole family - it's understood 
(woman in a van panchayat village, UP hills, cited in Britt, 1993: 148). 
 
  Rural women and men can't sit together. But we convey our decisions to them (man to 
author, Chattipur village, Orissa, 1998). 
 
The gender division of labour is another pernicious norm. The fact that women bear the main 
responsibility of childcare and housework, in addition to the load of agricultural work, cattle care, 
etc., makes for high work burdens and logistical constraints. This seriously restricts women's ability 
to attend lengthy meetings held at inconvenient times. As some of the women in Barde village 
(Karnataka, south India) told me in 1998: ‘There are problems in attending meetings since we need 
to cook and serve the evening meal. The meeting is long. We also have to feed the cattle’. Men are 
                                                 
    






usually reluctant to share not just domestic tasks and childcare, but even cattle care. Most women in 
the van panchayat villages she studied told Mansingh (1991) that they did not have time to ‘sit 
around for [the] four hours that it took to have a meeting in the middle of the day’. As a result 
women's attendance tended to thin out over time.  
 
Norms also reduce women’s participation by creating subtle gender hierarchies, such as by requiring 
women to sit on the floor while husbands and older men sit at a higher level on cots, or requiring 
women to sit at the back of the meeting space where they are less visible and less able to raise a 
point effectively. Moreover, where senior male family members are present, women either do not 
attend meetings, or do not oppose men publicly. The hierarchy that marks ‘respectful’ behaviour in 
the family also marks community gatherings.
25 
 
Social perceptions: Incorrect perceptions regarding women's abilities impinge on men’s willingness 
to include women in the CFGs. Men often view women's involvement in CFGs as serving no useful 
purpose and tend to downplay their potential contributions and abilities. Some of men's direct 
responses to questions are indicative: 
 
  There is no advantage in having women in the EC. We have been told by the forest officials 
that we must have two women in the committee, that is why we have included them (male to 
author, Pathari village, Karnataka). 
   
  Women can't make any helpful suggestions (man to author, Arjunpur village, Orissa, 1998). 
 
  Women are illiterate. If they come to meetings, we men might as well stay at home (EC 
chairman to author, Ghusra village, Dang district, Nepal, 1998). 
 
In some cases, when I asked the men who were decrying my paying attention to the women on the 
grounds that they were illiterate, whether they themselves were literate, I found that several of them 
weren’t! 
 
Entrenched territorial claims: Men oppose women’s inclusion much more strongly once their own 
claims are entrenched. For instance, where CFGs start out with only male members, or where men 
feel they have a prior claim to the land, they resist new claimants. Some young men in Banasur 
village (Karnataka) reacted to the idea of including women in CFGs as follows: ‘Women have 
DWARCA,
26 they have savings groups, why don't you leave the CFGs to us men?’ In Kudamunda 
village, Orissa, when I asked the women who wanted to take up their own separate patch for 
protection why they needed to do so, they responded: 
 
  If we have our own forest, we would not need to ask the men each time for a bit of wood. 
 
  They are not willing to give us even a patch to protect. Why would they be willing to give us 
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a whole tree if we asked?  
 
Personal endowments and attributes: Women’s lack of personal property or political connections 
in greater degree than men’s, also reduces the weight of their opinions. In addition, illiteracy and 
limited experience in public interaction undermines their effectiveness in public forums. While many 
male members too are illiterate, women's literacy levels are significantly lower. Some of these 
disadvantages can be overcome in part if the women are older, married, have leadership qualities, 
and the self-confidence to speak up. In many CFGs, the few women members are widows, or older 
married women living in their parental homes (Narain, 1994; Britt, 1997). 
 
Household endowments and attributes:  Finally, factors such as the class and caste position of the 
woman’s household is likely to matter where the village is multi-caste and dominated by the upper-
caste, o r where the CFG is constituted of several villages that are caste/class homogeneous in 
themselves, but that differ hierarchically in this respect from other villages in the CFG.
27 But the caste 
factor works in complex ways. On the one hand, being low-caste and poor can adversely affect a 
person's ability to bargain for a better deal within a predominantly upper-caste community, and even 
low caste men (like women in general) often hesitate to speak up at meetings in such contexts. On 
the other hand, low-caste women are less subject than upper-caste women to norms of seclusion, 
restricted mobility, and soft speech. 
 
  4.2 Factors Affecting Distributional Equity 
 
Similar (but not identical) factors affect gender inequitable outcomes in terms of costs and benefits. 
The principal factor underlying gender differences in cost sharing appears to be social norms 
governing the gender division of labour. As already discussed, women's primary responsibility for 
firewood and fodder means that the bulk of the costs of forgoing forest use fall on women. 
 
Benefit sharing is likely to be affected especially by five types of factors. One, there are the rules 
regarding entitlements to benefits. Here both entry rules and distribution rules matter. As noted 
earlier, access to some types of benefits is linked to membership. However, even if both spouses are 
members, the woman may not get a separate or additional share if the CFG has decided that the 
household rather than the individual will be the unit of distribution. In recent years, this has in fact 
proved to be a bottleneck in inducting women members in some regions such as Gujarat, where 
women are demanding shares on an individual basis as a condition for their joining. Hence while 
women's low participation in CFG decision-making  affects equity of outcome through the 
distribution rules, inequitable distribution rules can, in turn, restrict women's participation.  
 
Two, the norms/principles (willingness to pay, contribution, or need) underlying distribution affect 
equity of benefit  sharing. At present (as noted earlier), contribution (in terms of membership, 
protection efforts, etc.) is the dominant criterion underlying distribution rules in most CFGs, which 
allow equal access or amounts of firewood/fodder to those contributing. Auctions are undertaken in 
a few cases, and distribution in accordance with economic need is rare.  
 
Three, perceptions about need, contribution, and deservedness matter. Even if we were to shift from 
                                                 
    






contribution to need as the defining principle, whether or not women get a better deal can still 
depend on whether they are perceived as deserving more (Agarwal, 1997b, Sen, 1990). There can 
be and often is a divergence between what a person actually contributes, needs, or is able to do, 
and perceptions about her/his contributions, needs and abilities. Hence, for instance, women's 
contribution to household income is often undervalued, both by family members and by those 
implementing development programmes, because of the ‘invisible’ nature of many tasks that rural 
women perform within the home. These tasks are often economically invisible since they usually do 
not bring in cash returns, say, where women are working on family farms, or collecting firewood, 
fodder, etc. And the tasks are rendered physically invisible when they are done within the home 
compound (such as cattle care, stallfeeding animals, grain storage and processing, etc.). In the 
present context, women seen to be participating in forest management would thus be in a better 
position to claim equal benefits with men in that their contributions would be better recognized. 
 
Four, whether or not the outcome is equitable depends on pre-existing personal endowments and 
attributes. Given that women as a gender (even if not all women as individuals) have fewer personal 
endowments, CFG shares given only to male members typically result in inequitable outcomes for 
women in both rich and poor households. Again, women's personal attributes such as age and 
marital status can affect intra-household distribution by influencing perceptions about deservedness. 
 
Five, as we’ve noted, how acutely women are affected by forest closure or shortages is also 
influenced by their household endowments and attributes, in particular by where the households are 
placed in terms of class, caste, etc. However, in some respects, this can work in both directions. 
Women in households that own land and animals can get some fuel and fodder from private assets, 
but they are also likely to face greater strictures on their mobility, which limits their options of 
alternative collection sites. Moreover, for fuelwood, except those able to afford cooking gas, the 
class difference may not be substantial, since many women even of middle peasant households have 
to depend mostly on what they can themselves gather.  
 
 
  V. IMPROVING OUTCOMES: THE BARGAINING FRAMEWORK 
 
How can the noted factors, such as rules, norms, perceptions, women's personal endowments and 
attributes and their household endowments and attributes, etc., be acted upon to improve 
outcomes? 
 
Broadly rules are made at two levels: at the level of the State and that of the community. For 
instance, membership criteria for the general body or the EC under JFM are determined at the State 
level, but whether there should be total or partial closure of the protected area, or how different 
forest products should be distributed, is determined largely by the community. And social norms, 
social perceptions, and endowments, are constituted and contested at all levels -- within the State, 
the community, the family, and various institutions of civil governance (including NGOs). 
 
A promising analytical framework for examining the possibilities for change on all these counts is that 
of bargaining. Women's ability to change rules, norms, perceptions and endowments in a gender-
progressive direction would depend on their bargaining power - with the State, the community and 






three arenas?  
 
  5.1 Bargaining: Some conceptual issues
28 
 
The State: First, consider bargaining with the State. To begin with, the State too can be seen as an 
arena of bargaining at multiple levels. For instance, the State may formulate gender-progressive laws 
at the highest level, but it could face resistance in implementation from the local bureaucracy. Or 
some departments or ministries may pursue gender-progressive policies within an overall gender-
retrogressive State structure (women's ministries are cases in point). Likewise, there are often some 
gender-progressive individuals within State departments who play key positive roles, typically but 
not only in response to demands by interest groups.
29 In other words, the State is an arena of 
contestation between parties (such as policy making and policy implementing bodies), and/or 
between different regional elements of the State structure, with varying commitment to gender 
equality.  
 
The State might respond positively to demands by gender-progressive groups/NGOs because such 
groups could build up political pressure, say with the support of opposition parties and/or the media, 
with implications for voting patterns; or because of pressure from international aid agencies; or 
because the State recognizes the inefficacy both of market mechanisms and of its own machinery in 
implementing essential development programmes. In India, the State's attempts since the mid-1980s 
to enlist NGO support for various developmental projects, including that of community forestry, 
reflects this recognition. 
 
We would expect women's bargaining strength with the State to depend on a complex set of factors, 
such as, whether they function as a group or as individuals; and the cohesiveness and strength of the 
group. The bargaining power of such a group is likely to be higher the larger and more unified it is; 
the more the political weight carried by the castes of which it is composed; the greater its command 
over economic resources; the more the support from NGOs, the media, academics, international 
donors, and the State; and the more State officials are influenced by gender-progressive norms and 
perceptions. 
 
The Community: The second important arena of bargaining is the community. Implicit or explicit 
bargaining can occur between an individual (or a subset of individuals) and the community over the 
rules and norms governing, say, economic resource use, and social behavior, and over the 
enforcement of those rules and norms. Non-compliance with CFG rules could be seen as a form of 
implicit bargaining. 
 
As with the State, women's bargaining power within the community would be enhanced if they had 
support from external agents such as NGOs and the State. Group cohesiveness and strength is also 
important. For instance, an individual woman breaking seclusion norms could easily be penalized, 
say by casting aspersions on her character. Such reprisals are less possible if a group of women 
decide to transgress the norms.
30  
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In addition, in a multi-caste/class-heterogeneous village, we would expect women's bargaining 
power to depend on the socio-economic composition of their group and their ability to command 
funds. In the sharing of communal resources, for instance, the negotiating strength of low-caste or 
poor peasant women, even if they formed a group, is likely to be weaker than that of high-caste or 
rich peasant women whose caste or class as a whole commands greater power in the village. 
 
The family: The third major arena of bargaining is the family. Intrafamily bargaining for a more 
equitable sharing of benefits or tasks, or for greater freedom to participate publicly, is perhaps the 
most complex aspect of bargaining. This complexity is spelt out in Agarwal (1994, 1997b), but 
broadly four types of factors are likely to impinge on a woman's bargaining power in the home: her 
personal endowments and  attributes (educational level, whether or not she earns an income, 
property ownership, age, marital status, etc.); her ability to draw upon extra-household support from 
friends, relatives, women's groups in the village, gender-progressive NGOs outside the village, and 
the State; social norms (which might define who gets what, or who does what within the household); 




Some of the common determinants of bargaining power in all three arenas discussed above, are 
support from external agents, social norms and perceptions, and group strength. Norms, 
perceptions, and group strength require some elaboration. 
 
Social norms can affect bargaining power in both direct and indirect ways. For instance, norms that 
restrict women's presence in public spaces directly reduce women's ability to bargain for rule 
changes within CFGs. In addition, they do so indirectly by reducing women's ability to build contacts 
with NGOs or State officials. Social norms can also influence how bargaining is conducted: e.g. 
covertly or overtly; aggressively or quietly. In cultures or contexts where social norms stifle explicit 
voice, women may be pushed into using covert forms of contestation within the family, such as 
persistent complaining or withdrawing into silence (Agarwal, 1994). Moreover, attempts to change 
social norms can itself constitute a bargaining process.  
 
Social perceptions can affect women's bargaining power in so far as women's contributions and 
abilities diverge from perceptions about their contributions and abilities. As noted earlier, a good 
deal of what women do is rendered invisible and therefore undervalued by both families and 
communities. To the extent that women internalize these perceptions, they can self-restrict their 
range of options or what they seek to change and bargain over. To enhance women's bargaining 
power within the community or the family, a necessary step would thus be to change women's own 
perceptions about their potential options and abilities, as well as the perceptions of their families, the 
community and the State regarding their abilities and the legitimacy of their claims. 
 
Group strength can prove to be a critical factor at all levels of bargaining - the State, the community 
and the family - and in all forms of bargaining (including over social norms and perceptions). Here 
village women's group strength derives not merely from the number of women who would like, say, 
a change in rules and norms, but from their willingness to act collectively in their common interest, an 






group identity, over and above the possible divisiveness of caste or class. The creation of such 
group identity would need to be part of the process of improving outcomes for women. 
 
Let us now consider the actual experience of attempts to improve women's participation and 
distributional equity in CFGs. These experiences do not illustrate all elements of the bargaining 
framework spelt out above, but they reveal some key elements. 
 
5.2. Bargaining: Actual Experience 
 
The State: JFM experience indicates that bargaining with the State for changing the initial rules of 
entry is not very difficult to bring about. Pressure from external agents such as gender-progressive 
NGOs and key individuals, for instance, has led a number of Indian states to make JFM 
membership rules more women-inclusive. Here village women did not have to explicitly bargain for 
changes, but the women's movement in South Asia has brought about a sufficient shift in perceptions 
regarding gender inequalities to make such issues easier to resolve with the State, through outside 
intervention. Village women, on this count, thus start from a position of some bargaining strength. 
 
The community: Bargaining with the community to ensure that more women-inclusive membership 
rules are implemented, and to increase women's effective voice in CFGs, has proved more difficult. 
On the positive side, some of the gender-progressive NGOs, forest officials and donors have used 
their bargaining power with the community to bring about changes in women's favour, sometimes at 
their own initiative, at other times when village women approached them. 
 
For instance, some Indian NGOs have made high female membership in mixed groups a condition 
for forming the groups. In Gujarat, one NGO uses its bargaining strength to insist on 50% women 
when starting new CFGs. Similarly, some state-level officials in India have increased women’s 
membership in mixed groups, by stipulating that there should be at least 30% women in the general 
body, or by refusing to start meetings unless the men also invite the women (Viegas and Menon, 
1993; Sarin, 1998). For distributional equity, likewise, the staff of a Gujarat-based NGO took up 
women's complaints about firewood shortages at a CFG meeting. This resulted in a shift from total 
closure of the forest to its opening up for a few days annually. However, for a larger and sustained 
impact, an active input is required from women themselves. 
 
Left to themselves, women have typically relied on covert forms of bargaining for changing 
distributional rules, such as simply ignoring the closure rules, challenging the authority of the patrol 
group or the guard who catches them, persistently complaining, and so on. In some instances, this 
had led village committees to open up the forest for short spells. However, complaining or breaking 
rules (with the risk of being caught and fined) are seldom the most effective ways of changing the 
rules. For effective change, women are likely to need more formal involvement in rule making and 
the bargaining power to ensure changes in their favour. 
 
Experience on the ground suggests that to bring this about, for a start, a critical mass of vocal 
women is necessary. This can give women more voice in mixed forums, and help them challenge 
restrictive social norms and perceptions. As some women interviewed by Britt (1993: 146) in the 
UP hills stressed: ‘without a good majority of women present it is impossible to express opinions.’ 






apparatus that to build a critical mass of vocal women within CFGs will need, as a first step, the 
formation of separate women's groups. Maya Devi (a Nepalese g rassroots activist, with long 
experience in group organizing) puts it emphatically: 
 
  In mixed groups when women speak men make fun of them, so women need to learn to 
deal with this... When women join a [separate] group they gradually lose their fear of making 
fools of themselves when speaking up... Women need their own small groups. This is what I 
know from my 22 years of experience working with the government and NGOs. 
 
There is less consensus, however, on what type of group this should be. Where all-women CFGs 
have been formed, many of which have done well in terms of protection and increasing women's 
self-confidence. However, so far, all-women CFGs (as noted earlier), have usually arisen in special 
circumstances, and are still marginal in terms of numbers and area protected. Also, they cannot solve 
the problem of women's low presence and lack of effective voice in the more typical all-male or 
mixed CFGs. For this, other kinds of efforts are likely to be needed. Toward this end, some rural 
NGOs have been forming all-women savings-and-credit groups, which, unlike CFGs, do not involve 
a resource over which there is a generalised community claim. In some regions, more multi-
functional women's groups, such as mahila mangal dals in the UP hills, or amma samuhs in 
Nepal, are also doing well. 
 
Such separate women's groups (organised around savings or some other issue) have helped build 
women’s self-confidence and experience in collective functioning and promoted a sense of collective 
identity. They have also increased women's ability to deal with government agencies, altered male 
perceptions regarding women's capabilities, and brought about some change in social norms which 
earlier defined only the domestic as legitimate female space. The response below is fairly typical: 
 
  Men used to shut us up and say we shouldn't speak. Women learned to speak up in a 
sangathan (group). Earlier we couldn't speak up even at home. Now we can be more 
assertive and also go out. I am able to help other women gain confidence as well (woman 
leader to author, Vejpur village, Gujarat, 1999). 
 
In fact, these experiences are not dissimilar to those of many other rural women's groups across 
South Asia. These too indicate that group strength, external agency support, and activities that 
enable women to make a visible contribution (especially in monetary terms) can alter social norms 
and perceptions, and increase the social acceptance of women in public roles. But in many villages, 
separate women's groups have also sharpened gender segregation in collective functioning. Often 
women's savings groups are seen as ‘women's groups’ and the CFGs as `men's groups'. Basically, 
working collectively in separate groups does not adequately challenge unequal gender relations or 
noticeably change the dynamics o f  mixed group functioning. In other words, forming separate 
women's groups appears to be a necessary condition but not a sufficient one for women's effective 
participation in the CFGs. 
 
For effective integration, more concerted efforts appear necessary. In a few cases, NGOs working 
with both women and men have sought to integrate all-women groups with the CFG. An NGO in 
rural Karnataka, for instance, encourages the women’s savings groups to discuss CFG functioning, 






villages, some 80-90% of the women in the savings groups are now in the CFG general body.
31 To 
bring this about, however, has taken many years of persistent effort and trust building between the 
NGO, the women, and the villagers. 
 
An alternative approach (to my knowledge yet to be tried) could be to form a women’s sub-group 
within each mixed CFG. Such a subgroup could first meet separately to discuss women’s specific 
forest-related concerns, and then strategically place these concerns in the full CFG meeting. This 
could also enable women EC members to better represent women’s interests.  
 
The family: Bargaining within the family has received the least attention. Most rural NGOs do not 
directly tackle intra-household gender relations, although forming all-women groups can have 
indirect positive effects. For instance, during my fieldvisits I found a number of cases where a 
women's group had supported individual women in their negotiations with husbands, or where being 
a group member had improved women's situation at home. 
 
  There are one or two men who objected to their wives attending our meetings, and said you 
can't go. But when our women's association came to their aid, the men let their wives go 
(women to author in Almavadi village, Gujarat, 1998). 
 
  My husband feels I contribute financially, take up employment, obtain credit for the home. 
This increases his respect for me (woman to author, Almavadi village, Gujarat, 1998). 
 
In other words, group strength and women’s visible contributions can help loosen restrictive social 
norms, and may change a man's view of his wife's deservedness. However, certain types of norms, 
such as the gender division of domestic work, are particularly inflexible. Also gender inequalities in 
economic endowments remain entrenched, putting women in a considerably weaker bargaining 
position in the family, relative to men (Agarwal, 1994, 1997b). 
 
Finally, any group, including a CFG, is likely to be affected not only by its immediate locale, but also 
by the wider context of structural and cultural inequalities within which it is located. For instance, 
both participation and distributional equity are affected by the pre-existing inequalities predicated on 
the caste and class of the women's households, as well as on gender. These inequalities are unlikely 
to decline substantially within the parameters of CFG functioning. They would need more wide-
ranging measures to improve the access of women, and of poor and low-caste households in 
general, to land and other assets. 
 
 
  VI. CONCLUSION 
 
CFGs are a significant example of group functioning. While many have done reasonably well in 
regenerating the environment (at least in an immediate sense), they have been less successful in 
bringing about women's participation in decision-making, or in ensuring gender equity in the sharing 
of costs and benefits from forest protection. As a result, they have also failed to tap the full potential 
of the collective effort. Improving participation and equity is thus important both in itself and because 
                                                 
    






it can prove complementary to (rather than, as usually assumed, in conflict with) efficiency. 
 
The analysis shows that for more participative, equitable, and efficient outcomes, changes in factors 
such as rules, norms and perceptions, and the pre-existing structural inequalities in endowments and 
attributes of the women’s households and of women themselves, appear necessary.  
 
The paper argues that it is useful to conceptualize such change within a bargaining framework, and to 
act on the factors that will strengthen women's bargaining power with the State, the community and 
the family. This has been achieved to some degree through the intervention of external agents, such 
as NGOs, forest officials and donors, who have a cted both directly and indirectly, the latter 
especially by forming separate women's groups at the village level to enhance women’s self-
confidence and collective strength. At the same time, the analysis cautions that such separate 
women’s groups could also lead to greater gender segregation, unless conscious steps are taken to 
integrate these women within mixed CFGs. An alternative approach of forming women’s subgroups 
within each CFG might work better. In either case, these would be only a few steps among the 
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